By Tyler Lynch<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The actions of Martin Luther King, Jr. in his campaign\nagainst segregation had as their wellspring a Judeo-Christian tradition of\nnonviolence and justice that stretches from the Old Testament through to\nChristian philosophers of the medieval period. In particular, the natural law\nphilosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas that provides a major framework for King\u2019s ethical\nthought, and his justification of the Civil Rights Movement. This essay examines the thought of\n Dr. Martin Luther King, especially in his Letter\n From Birmingham Jail<\/em>, in comparison to and contrast with the thought of\n Thomas Aquinas, with focus on his Treatise\n on Law<\/em>. Tracing this lineage is crucially important to understanding\n King\u2019s views on human rights and justice. Indeed, without considering King\u2019s\n spiritual heritage it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the moral\n framework of the Civil Rights Movement at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps\n the most accessible introduction to the ethical convictions of King lie in his\n Letter From Birmingham Jail<\/em>, drafted\n in 1963 while King was confined in the eponymous Alabama jail. Written as a\n response to a letter published by eight white clergymen who denounced King\u2019s work as \u201cunwise and\n untimely,\u201d King delivered, under trying circumstances, a work of exceptional lucidity and moral force (King). The\n letter is a justification not only of the foundations and principles of the\n American Civil Rights Movement, but a timeless articulation of the struggle of\n all oppressed people and a vindication of the \u201cyearning for freedom\u201d (King).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In response to the charge that he\n and his cohorts showed a \u201cwillingness to break laws,\u201d King marshalled the\n philosophy of classic Christian thinkers like Augustine and Aquinas in\n rebuttal (King). King concedes that it is an apparent paradox and a\n \u201clegitimate concern\u201d that the civil rights movement advocates adhering to some\n laws and breaking others. However, he responds that \u201cthere are two types of\n laws: just and unjust.\u201d With this quotation, King has\n already formulated his argument in the terms of Thomas Aquinas before Aquinas\n is even mentioned in the next sentence. Aquinas agrees as to the the inherent\n just or unjust nature of \u201claws framed by man\u201d in the Treatise on Law, <\/em>Q.96, Art.4, c.o.<\/em>.\n King proceeds to make another fundamentally Thomistic argument: that it is\n morally and legally right to obey just laws, while \u201cone has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust\n laws.\u201d Aquinas is again in concordance, arguing that unjust laws are \u201cnot\n binding in conscience\u201d (ST I-II, Q.96, Art.4, c.o.<\/em>). King has extended this logically from the realm of\n conscience into the practical sphere. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The\n pressing question, for both Aquinas and King, is how to differentiate between\n a just law and an unjust one. King proceeds to answer this question \u201cin the\n terms of St. Thomas Aquinas,\u201d although he was already using Thomistic\n language. Thus it is to a closer examination of those terms that\n we should turn to next.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Aquinas distinguishes between four types of law in his Treatise on Law<\/em>, written in the 13th Century as part of his magnum opusof theology and philosophy, the Summa Theologica<\/em>. The four types are eternal law, natural law, human law, and divine law. Eternal law is the rational ordering principle of the natural universe, ultimately emanating from God. It is the \u201cSupreme reason\u201d that \u201cimplies order\u201d into created things through rational principles (ST I-II, Q.1, Art.1; a.d.3). The eternal law \u201cmust be called eternal\u201d because its source, God, \u201cis not subject to time\u201d, and it is a law <\/em>because it predictably governs all of existence (ST I-II, Q.1, Art.1, c.o.). Indeed, Aquinas would argue that the universe itself is only rational because it is superintended by the rational principles of the eternal law, which draws all things to their \u201cproper act and end\u201d (ST I-II, Q.91, Art.2, c.o.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Natural law is an extension of the\n eternal law, encompassing those elements of it that govern the actions of\n free, rational beings. For Aquinas, \u201cthe natural law is nothing else than the\n rational creature\u2019s participation in the eternal law\u201d (ST I-II, Q.91, Art.2,\n a.d.1). The rational participation is important because, as Aquinas says, participation in the eternal law is\n essentially to law in itself insofar as that participation is rational and\n intellectual in character (ST I-II, Q.91, Art.2, a.d.3). Aquinas quotes the\n New Testament to define natural law as something inherently knowable by all,\n which all human beings have consciousness of. It is the universal, objective\n standard by which we know \u201cwhat is good and what is evil\u201d (ST I-II, Q.91, Art.2,\n c.o.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Human law is rooted in natural law,\n but extends it to the temporal and the specific. Natural law may be interwoven\n with the fabric of our being, inclining us to what is good, but it does not\n specifically dictate proper action in every frame of human action. Thus, human\n law is necessary to establish the \u201cgeneral rules and measures of all things\n relating to human conduct\u201d (ST I-II, Q.91, Art.3, a.d.2). It concerns the\n \u201cparticular determination of certain matters\u201d and as such, does not have the universal\n quality of eternal or natural law (ST I-II, Q.91, Art.3, c.o.). Aquinas fully\n accepts that human law would result in \u201cdifferent and contrary laws\u201d across time and culture to\n facilitate different modes of being in the world (ST I-II, Q.91, Art.4, c.o.). It is human law that is referred\n to when Aquinas and King state that laws can be just or unjust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Divine law is not directly referenced in the Letter from Birmingham Jail<\/em>, but should not be ignored in a discussion of Thomistic natural law philosophy. Divine law is that which concerns the human soul beyond its rational elements, and is not solely discernible by natural reason. \u201cMan is ordained to an end of eternal happiness,\u201d says Aquinas, \u201cwhich is inproportionate to his natural faculty\u201d (ST I-II, Q.93, Art.4, c.o.). It is divine law that concerns this end. Where reason falls short, where the \u201cuncertainty of human judgement\u201d confuses, where \u201cman is not competent to judge,\u201d the transcendent Divine law steps in, pulling man to his predestined end of eternal happiness and working to \u201cforbid all evil deeds\u201d and ensure that objective good is rewarded (ST I-II, Q.93, Art.4, c.o.). While there is a clear continuum from eternal law, which orders the universe, to natural law, which governs good and evil out of the eternal law, to human law, which extends natural into specific situations, divine law is in a class of its own. It is not entirely rationally explicable, as it \u201cis given by God […] in a yet higher way\u201d (ST I-II, Q.93, Art.4, c.o.; a.d.2). Its purpose is also not the simple avoidance of evil and the pursuit of good, but salvation and eternal union with God. With this framework in place, it is possible to understand the argument made by Aquinas and King as to what constitutes an unjust law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n King defines an unjust law using\n Aquinas\u2019s formulation as \u201ca human law that is not rooted in eternal law and\n natural law,\u201d but this is rather vague. It is rather simple for a law to be\n rooted in natural law, as long as it fits with the central precept of that law:\n \u201cthat good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided\u201d (ST I-II,\n Q.94, Art.2, c.o.). This first precept is very broad, and does not detail which\n <\/em>things are good and which are evil.\n Martin Luther King then makes four arguments in an attempt to show that\n segregation laws do not bring about good or avoid evil, and are thus not based\n in natural law, making them unjust on Thomistic terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n King\u2019s\n first argument is not especially Thomistic. King\u2019s argument is that \u201cany law\n that degrades human personality is unjust\u201d (King). This claim is never made by\n Aquinas in the Treatise on Law<\/em>, and\n is more ideologically concordant with the theology of Martin Buber and Paul\n Tillich, quoted by King to show that segregation \u201cdistorts the soul and\n damages the personality\u201d (King). However, this argument is not wholly alien to\n the language of the Treatise<\/em>.\n Aquinas speaks of \u201cthe last end of human life\u201d as \u201cbliss or happiness,\u201d and\n writes that the natural law aids in \u201cpreserving human life, and of warding off\n its obstacles\u201d (ST I-II, Q.90, Art.2, c.o.; Q.94, Art.2, c.o.). Segregation\n law clearly inhibits the pursuit of happiness and has no effect in preserving\n life or alleviating its difficulties. It is not hard to see on Thomistic terms\n that through degrading the human condition, segregation law degrades the\n personality as well, which is Divinely-directed towards happiness. While this\n argument is not explicitly Thomistic, it is roughly compatible with his\n philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n King\n is in more Thomistic territory when he writes that \u201can unjust law is a code\n that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but\n does not make binding on itself\u201d (King). This is deeply unjust for Aquinas,\n who rallies a host of quotes in opposition to the attitude. \u201cWhatever law a\n man makes for another, he should keep himself,\u201d he writes (ST I-II, Q.96,\n Art.5, a.d.3). Aquinas quotes Jesus in condemnation of those that \u201cbind heavy\n burdens and lay them on men\u2019s shoulders, but with a finger of their own they\n will not move them,\u201d a phrase all the more pertinent when seen in context of\n the emancipation of African-Americans from slavery and segregation (ST I-II,\n Q.96, Art.5, a.d.3). Here King and Aquinas are in direct agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n King\n next argues against illegitimately-made laws, taking his argument from\n Aquinas. King writes that \u201ca law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority\n that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting\n or devising the law\u201d (King). Aquinas\n rejects any law not made by and for the people, saying that \u201cthe making of a\n law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care\n of the whole people\u201d (ST I-II, Q.90, Art.3, c.o.). There is no room for\n infliction of laws on minorities at all. \u201cCoercive power is vested in the\n whole people or in some public personage,\u201d Aquinas repeats (ST I-II, Q.90,\n Art.3, a.d.3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally,\n King argues that a law can be \u201cjust on its face and unjust in its application\u201d\n (King). King references his charge of \u201cparading without a permit\u201d as an example\n of a reasonable law being used oppressively. Aquinas is sensitive to the same\n problem, and is utterly opposed to the interpretation of law contrary to the\n common good. \u201cIf a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be\n harmful to the common good,\u201d he writes, \u201cit should not be observed\u201d (ST I-II,\n Q.96, Art.6, c.o.). Aquinas cites the example of a city whose gates are barred\n by law, and the injustice of maintaining that law if it would mean the deaths\n of citizens outside the walls (ST I-II, Q.96, Art.6, c.o.). Aquinas and King\n are in essential agreement as to what constitutes an unjust law under natural\n law philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the two thinkers differ\n significantly on the value of civil disobedience, with Aquinas being far less\n eager to advocate social disturbance. He values order and forbearance to a\n degree that King would, most likely, find deeply disappointing. While Aquinas\n concedes that unjust laws must not be followed, he qualifies this by giving\n possible exception \u201cin order to avoid scandal or disturbance\u201d (ST I-II, Q.96,\n Art.4, c.o.). A man is not bound to obey a law that \u201cinflict unjust hurt on\n its subjects,\u201d but only provided \u201che avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more\n grievous hurt.\u201d\n Absent in the Treatise on Law<\/em> is any\n sense of the need to \u201carouse the conscience of the community,\u201d something King\n states is borne from \u201chighest respect for the law\u201d (King).<\/p>\n\n\n\n King was emphatically opposed to acting out of fear of scandal, something Aquinas takes quite seriously. Aquinas sounds a good deal like the \u201cwhite moderate\u201d whom King rebuked as the \u201cgreat stumbling block in [the Negro\u2019s] stride toward freedom.\u201d The white moderate, says King, \u201cis more devoted to \u2018order\u2019 than to justice; [and] prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice.\u201d Whereas it is imprudent to place Aquinas squarely on the side of order rather than justice, social stability is far more dear to Aquinas\u2019s heart than King\u2019s. King would never be resigned to tolerance of an unjust status quo by any means\u2014 he believed the erasure of unjust laws \u201cmust be demanded by the oppressed\u201d and would occur no other way (King). He saw no other choice for African-Americans but to \u201copenly, lovingly\u201d disobey the segregation laws that oppress them and willingly accept the consequences (King). Aquinas\u2019s concern for social order is not to be found in the Letter from Birmingham Jail<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This difference comes down, in large part, to Aquinas\u2019s conviction of the inherent divine sanction of power and order\u2014a conviction Martin Luther King seems to lack. Aquinas believed there was something unsettling and potentially anarchical in disobeying laws\u2014even unjust ones \u2014laid down by authority, because authority is Divinely sanctioned. Aquinas quotes the Letter to the Romans<\/em> to justify this, stating that \u201call human power is from God,\u201d and anyone that \u201cresisteth the power. . . resisteth the ordinance of God\u201d (ST I-II, Q.96, Art.4, a.d.1, quoting Rm 13:1.2). King, however, is adamant in his Letter <\/em>that \u201claw and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice.\u201d One wonders whether, for Aquinas, law and order are something closer to goods in themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For\n all this, the positions of Thomas Aquinas and M.L.K. are not so very\n disparate. Despite his concern with order and avoidance of scandal, Aquinas\n never denies that unjust laws are not laws binding in conscience, and in this\n regard stands fundamentally with King. King himself shows a certain respect for\n civil order too, stating that he is not an anarchist and does not \u201cadvocate\n evading or defying the law\u201d (King). \u201cOne who breaks an unjust law must do so\n openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty,\u201d he wrote.\n King\u2019s willingness to accept the penalties of breaking unjust laws (in his\n case, imprisonment for protesting without a permit) elevates him about the\n mere disturbers of the peace that Aquinas is so fearful of.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The looming presence of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Letter from Birmingham Jail <\/em>would not have been lost on the eight churchmen to whom King wrote. For the controversial Baptist preacher to utilize the philosophy of the perhaps most eminent theologian and philosopher in Western Christianity to buttress his campaign of civil disobedience was an effective rhetorical technique, and bolsters King\u2019s credibility by basing his arguments in terms the clergymen would understand. Martin Luther King is highly effective in giving credence to his arguments through highly pertinent appeals to authority, from the Biblical in St. Paul, the modern in Paul Tillich, to the secular in Thomas Jefferson. The influence of Thomas Aquinas on M.L.K. is no mere rhetorical device. Indeed, it is difficult to fathom King\u2019s justification of direct action and civil disobedience having the same weight and philosophical rigour, were it not for his deep and abiding understanding of the natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas. We find the Treatise on Law <\/em>has gained an unexpected legacy. Despite being no progressivist himself, Aquinas lay down in the Treatise on Law<\/em> an enduring and robust defense of justice that would become one of the moral cornerstones of the Civil Rights Movement in America. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Works Cited<\/p>\n\n\n\n Aquinas, St. Thomas. \u201cTreatise on\n Law.\u201d Sophia Project.<\/em> http:\/\/www.sophia-project.org\/uploads\/1\/3\/9\/5\/13955288\/aquinas_law.pdf<\/a>. Accessed 17 Nov, 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n King, Jr., Martin Luther. \u201cLetter\n from a Birmingham Jail.\u201d University of\n Pennsylvania.<\/em> https:\/\/www.africa.upenn.edu\/Articles_Gen\/Letter_Birmingham.html<\/a>. Accessed 17 Nov, 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cStatement and Response: King in\n Birmingham.\u201d Trinity International\n University<\/em>. https:\/\/moodle.tiu.edu\/pluginfile.php\/57183\/mod_resource\/content\/1\/StatementAndResponseKingBirmingham1.pdf<\/a>. Accessed 16 Nov, 2018<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" By Tyler Lynch The actions of Martin Luther King, Jr. in his campaign against segregation had as their wellspring a Judeo-Christian tradition of nonviolence and justice that stretches from the … Continue reading “St. Thomas in Birmingham Jail: Aquinas\u2019 Natural Law and the Ethics of M.L.K.”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":333,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15,7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-789","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-2019-issue","category-essays"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/789","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/333"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=789"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/789\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":826,"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/789\/revisions\/826"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=789"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=789"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wordpress.viu.ca\/compassrose\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=789"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}